RECORD: S155.1 Wallace, A. R. 1869. The origin of species controversy, I. Nature 1: 105-107.

REVISION HISTORY: Body text helpfully provided by Charles H. Smith from his Alfred Russel Wallace Page http://people.wku.edu/charles.smith/wallace/S155.htm


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The Origin of Species Controversy

Habit and Intelligence, in their Connexion with the Laws of Matter and Force. A series of Scientific Essays. By Joseph John Murphy. (Macmillan and Co., 1869.)

I

The flood of light that has been thrown on the obscurest and most recondite of the forces and forms of Nature by the researches of the last few years, has led many acute and speculative intellects to believe that the time has arrived when the hitherto insoluble problems of the origin of life and of mind may receive a possible and intelligible, if not a demonstrable, solution. The grand doctrine of the conservation of energy, the all-embracing theory of evolution, a more accurate conception of the relation of matter to force, the vast powers of spectrum analysis on one side, showing us as it does the minute anatomy of the universe, and the increased efficiency of the modern microscope on the other, which enables us to determine with confidence the structure, or absence of structure, in the minutest and lowest forms of life, furnish us with a converging battery of scientific weapons which we may well think no mystery of Nature can long withstand. Our literature accordingly teems with essays of more or less pretension on the development of living forms, the nature and origin of life, the unity of all force, physical and mental, and analogous subjects.

The work of which I now propose to give some account, is a favourable specimen of the class of essays alluded to, for although it does not seem to be in any degree founded on original research, its author has studied with great care, and has, in most cases, thoroughly understood, the best writers on the various subjects he treats of, and has brought to the task a considerable amount of original thought and ingenious criticism. He thus effectually raises the character of his book above that of a mere compilation, which, in less able hands, it might have assumed.

The introductory chapter treats of the characteristics of modern scientific thought, and endeavours to show, "that the chief and most distinctive intellectual characteristic of this age consists in the prominence given to historical and genetic methods of research, which have made history scientific, and science historical: whence has arisen the conviction that we cannot really understand anything unless we know its origin; and whence also we have learned a more appreciative style of criticism, a deeper distrust, dislike, and dread, of revolutionary methods, and a more intelligent and profound love of both mental and political freedom." The first six chapters are devoted to a careful sketch of the great motive powers of the universe, of the laws of motion, and of the conservation of energy. The author here suggests the introduction of a useful word, radiance, to express the light, radiant heat, and actinism of the sun, which are evidently modifications of the same form of energy,—and a more precise definition of the words force and strength, the former for forces which are capable of producing motion, the latter for mere resistances like cohesion.

He enumerates the primary forces of Nature as, gravity, capillary attraction, and chemical affinity, and notices as an important generalisation "that all primary forces are attractive; there is no such thing in Nature as a primary repulsive force" (p. 43). Now here there seem to be two errors. Cohesion, which is entirely unnoticed, is surely as much a primary force as capillary attraction, and, in fact, is probably the more general force, of which the other is only a particular case; and elasticity is the effect of a primary repulsive force. In fact, at p. 26, we find the author arguing that all matter is perfectly elastic, for, when two balls strike together, the lost energy due to imperfect elasticity of the mass is transferred to the molecules, and becomes heat. But this surely implies repulsion of the molecules; and Mr. Bayma has shown, in his "Molecular Mechanics," that repulsion is as necessary a property of matter as attraction.

The eighth chapter discusses the phenomena of crystallisation; and the next two, the chemistry and dynamics of life. The reality of a "vital principle" is maintained as "the unknown and undiscoverable something which the properties of mere matter will not account for, and which constitutes the differentia of living beings." Besides the formation of organic compounds, we have the functions of organisation, instinct, feeling, and thought, which could not conceivably be resultants from the ordinary properties of matter. At the same time it is admitted that conceivableness is not a test of truth, and that all questions concerning the origin of life are questions of fact, and must be solved, not by reasoning, but by observation and experiment; but it is maintained that the

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facts render it most probable that "life, like matter and energy, had its origin in no secondary cause, but in the direct action of creative power." Chapters X. to XIV. treat of organisation and development, and give a summary of the most recent views on these subjects, concluding with the following tabular statement of organic functions:—

     Formative or Vegetative Functions, essentially consisting in the Transformation of Matter.
          Chemical . . . . . Formation of organic compounds.
Structural . . . . . Formation of tissue / Formation of organs.

     Animal Functions, consisting essentially in the Transformation of Energy.
          Motor . . . . . Spontaneous / Reflex / Consensual / Voluntary.
Sensory . . . . . Sensation / Mind.

In the fifteenth chapter we first come to one of the author's special subjects,—the Laws of Habit. He defines habit as follows: "The definition of habit and its primary law, is that all vital actions tend to repeat themselves; or, if they are not such as can repeat themselves, they tend to become easier on repetition." All habits are more or less hereditary, are somewhat changeable by circumstances, and are subject to spontaneous variations. The prominence of a habit depends upon its having been recently exercised; its tenacity on the length of time (millions of generations it may be) during which it has been exercised. The habits of the species or genus are most tenacious, those of the individual often the most prominent. The latter may be quickly lost, the former may appear to be lost, but are often latent, and are liable to reappear, as in cases of reversion. The fact that active habits are strengthened, while passive impressions are weakened, by repetition, is due in both cases to the law of habit; for, in the latter, the organism acquires the habit of not responding to the impression. As an example, two men hear the same loud bell in the morning; it calls the one to work, as he is accustomed to listen to it, and so it always wakes him; the other has to rise an hour later, he is accustomed to disregard it, and so it soon ceases to have any effect upon him. Habit has produced in these two cases exactly opposite results. Habits are capable of any amount of charge, but only a slight change is possible in a short time; and in close relation with this law are the following laws of variation.

Changes of external circumstances are beneficial to organisms if they are slight; but injurious if they are great, unless made gradually.

Changes of external circumstances are agreeable when slight, but disagreeable when great.

Mixture of different races is beneficial to the vigour of the offspring if the races mixed are but slightly different; while very different races will produce either weak offspring, or infertile offspring, or none at all. Even the great law of sexuality, requiring the union of slightly different individuals to continue the race, seems to stand in close connection with the preceding laws.

The next seven chapters treat of the laws of variation, distribution, morphology, embryology, and classification, as all pointing to the origin of species by development; and we then come to the causes of development, in which the author explains his views as follows:—

    These two causes, self-adaptation and natural selection, are the only purely physical causes that have been assigned, or that appear assignable, for the origin of organic structure and form. But I believe they will account for only part of the facts, and that no solution of the questions of the origin of organization, and the origin of organic species, can be adequate, which does not recognise and Organising Intelligence, over and above the common laws of matter. . . . But we must begin the inquiry by considering how much of the facts of organic structure and vital function may be accounted for by the two laws of self-adaptation and natural selection, before we assert that any of those facts can only be accounted for by supposing an Organising Intelligence.

Again:

Life does not suspend the action of the ordinary forces of matter, but works through them. I believe that wherever there is life there is intelligence, and that intelligence is at work in every vital process whatever, but most discernibly in the highest. . . . Nutrition, circulation, and respiration are in a great degree to be explained as results of physical and chemical laws;—but sensation, perception, and thought cannot be so explained. They belong exclusively to life; and similarly the organs of those functions—the nerves, the brain, the eye, and the ear—can have originated, I believe, solely by the action of an Organising Intelligence.

Admitting Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of the vascular system, and possibly of the muscular, by self-adaptation, he denies that any such merely physical theory will account for the origin of the special complexities of the visual apparatus:

Neither the action of light on the eye, nor the actions of the eye itself, can have the slightest tendency to produce the wondrous complex histological structure of the retina; nor to form the transparent humours of the eye into lenses; nor to produce the deposit of black pigment that absorbs the stray rays that would otherwise hinder clear vision; nor to produce the iris, and endow it with its power of closing under a strong light, so as to protect the retina, and expanding again when the light is withdrawn; nor to give the iris its two nervous connections, one of which has its root in the sympathetic ganglia, and causes expansion, while the other has its root in the brain and causes contraction.

Nor will he allow that Natural Selection (which he admits may produce any simple organ, such as a bat's wing) is applicable to this case; and he makes use of two arguments which have considerable weight. One is that of Mr. Herbert Spencer, who shows that in all the higher animals natural selection must be aided by self-adaptation, because an alteration in any part of a complex organ necessitates concomitant alterations in may other parts, and these cannot be supposed m occur by spontaneous variation. But in the case of the eye he shows that self-adaptation cannot occur, whence he conceives it may be proved to be almost an infinity of chances to one against the simultaneous variations necessary to produce an eye ever having occurred. The other argument is, that well-developed eyes occur in the higher orders of the three great groups, Annulosa, Mollusca, and Vertebrata, while the lower orders of each have rudimentary eyes or none; so that the variations requisite to produce this wonderfully complicated organ must have occurred three times over independently of each other. In the first of these objections, he assumes that many variations must occur simultaneously, and on this assumption his whole argument rests. He notices Mr. Darwin's illustration of the greyhound having been brought to its present high state of perfection by breeders selecting for one point at a time, but does not think it possible "that any apparatus, consisting of lenses,

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can be improved by any method whatever, unless the alterations in the density and the curvature are perfectly simultaneous." This is an entire misconception. If a lens has too short or too long a focus, it may be amended either by an alteration of curvature, or an alteration of density; if the curvature be irregular, and the rays do not converge to a point, then any increased regularity of curvature will be an improvement. So the contraction of the iris and the muscular movements of the eye are neither of them essential to vision, but only improvements which might have been added and perfected at any stage of the construction of the instrument. Thus it does not seem at all impossible for spontaneous variations to have produced all the delicate adjustments of the eye, once given the rudiments of it, in nerves exquisitely sensitive to light and colour; but it does seem certain that it could only be effected with extreme slowness; and the fact that in all three of the primary groups, Mollusca, Annulosa, and Vertebrata, species with well-developed eyes occur so early as in the Silurian period, is certainly a difficulty in view of the strict limits physicists now place to the age of the solar system.


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